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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Entrapment as a Matter of
Law: Contraband Supplied to Defendants by
Government Agents-Epps v. State, 417 So. 2d
543 (Miss. 1982).
According to evidence produced by the State, on March 27,
1979, Detective L. C. Russell and Alex Butler, a confidential in-
formant, went to the house of Mary Jackson, Butler's girlfriend.
Butler had told Detective Russell that Miss Jackson would take
him to a local drug dealer where he could purchase cocaine. Miss
Jackson, accompanied by Detective Russell, went to the home of
Johnny Lee Epps, where Miss Jackson asked Epps whether he had
any "stuff." Epps replied that he had a "small piece" left, and
Detective Russell and Miss Jackson agreed to buy the cocaine.
Epps went into his house and returned with a small package
which he gave to Miss Jackson, who handed it to Detective Rus-
sell. After examining it, he gave Epps sixty dollars for the cocaine.
About five months later, on September 5, 1979, Epps was arrested
and charged with the sale of cocaine.1 Epps testified at trial that
the cocaine was supplied to him by the police informant, Alex
Butler.2 Epps also testified that two days before the March 27,
1979, sale Alex Butler came to his residence and asked him to
keep some cocaine for him, telling him that Mary Jackson would
come by and give him forty dollars for the cocaine. Epps testified
that Alex Butler said he would come by later and pick up the
money, although he never did.' Otherwise, Mr. Epps corroborated
Miss Jackson's testimony as to the details of the sale.
Alex Butler, the police informant, did not testify at the trial;'
therefore, Epps' testimony that Mr. Butler came to him and asked
him to hold the cocaine for him until Miss Jackson picked it up
later remained uncontradicted. Detective L. C. Russell testified
that he did not know how Johnny Epps obtained the cocaine. On
1. Epps v. State, 417 So. 2d 543, 544 (Miss. 1982). Epps was sentenced to a term of
twenty-five years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections, twenty years suspended,
with five years to serve and five years on probation.
2. Epps, 417 So. 2d at 544.
3. Id.
4. Epps, 417 So. 2d at 545. "The confidential informant here was not an informant
whose identity could not be disclosed because the record is replete with references to him
and his identity." Id.
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these facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the circuit court and discharged Mr. Epps.'
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT LAW
A good way to understand what the Mississippi Supreme
Court did in the Epps case and the reason for this decision is to
compare it with the federal precedent on entrapment. The first
suggestion of entrapment as a defense in federal court appears to
be United States v. Whittier.' The first federal case to recognize
and sustain a claim of entrapment by government officials as a
defense was Woo Wai v. United States.
7
The defense of entrapment must be distinguished from decep-
tive practices employed by government agents to detect and cap-
ture criminals. Deceptive police practices are usually upheld as a
means of detecting and fighting crime.' No federal court has ever
declared that a criminal defendant enjoys a recognized constitu-
tional right not to be the subject of police deception. 9 "It is only
when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal
design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrap-
ment comes into play." 10
Many different views have been expressed as to why entrap-
ment should be a defense to criminal conduct on the part of the
accused."' Perhaps the best reason came from Judge Sanborn
when he said, "The first duties of the officers of the law are to
prevent, not punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and
5. Id. (Justices Dan M. Lee and Lenore Prather took no part in the decision or the
opinion of the court).
6. 28 F. Cas. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16) (Treat, J., concurring) ("No court
should, even to aid in detecting a supposed offender, lend its countenance to a violation of
positive law, or to contrivances for inducing a person to commit a crime.").
7. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The defendant was induced into illegally bringing
Chinese women across the Mexican border into California.
8. See Grim v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895) ("Artifice and stratagem
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises."); United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) ("[flor there are circumstances when the use of deceit is the
only practicable law enforcement technique available.").
9. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932).
10. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
1I. See generally Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 436 (1932) (criminal statutes should not
be applied to defendants when the circumstances under which the crime was committed
would make the statute's application shocking to the sense of justice); Id. at 456 (Roberts,
J., separate opinion joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.) (Entrapment "ought to be based on
the inherent right of the court not to be made an instrument of wrong."). See also Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring on the result)
(convicting a defendant entrapped by the police an improper use of governmental power);
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (to preserve
the purity of the courts).
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create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing
it.' 1 2 There are three basic theories of entrapment most often ad-
vanced by the courts and writers. The oldest and most widely rec-
ognized is the intent or predisposition theory. The second theory is
the due process approach, and the last major theory is the objec-
tive approach.
Sorrells v. United States3 was the first major United States
Supreme Court case to make an in-depth analysis of the entrap-
ment defense and to discuss the predisposition theory. In that
case, the Court found the defendant was entrapped into selling
whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act"' by a prohi-
bition agent who repeatedly asked the defendant to get him some
whiskey. Sorrells held that when determining whether the accused
was entrapped, the controlling issue is "whether the defendant is a
person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials."' 5 Obviously, to determine whether a
person is otherwise innocent, "[t]he predisposition and criminal
design of the defendant are relevant."' 6 The focus of the entrap-
ment defense is on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to
commit the offense.' 7 Considering the defendant's predisposition
as the central factor when determining whether entrapment is a
valid defense is clearly a subjective approach.
This subjective approach has always dominated the majority
opinions of the Supreme Court.18 However, a large and influential
minority' 9 has repeatedly criticized such an analysis. Because of
the widely divergent views of the justices on what should be the
focus of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court has not syn-
thesized one consistent line of analysis for entrapment problems.
The primary case exemplifying the due process approach to
12. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921) (cited in Sorrells, 287 U.S.
at 443).
13. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
14. 27 U.S.C. (1927) (repealed 1935).
15. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
18. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
19. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491-500 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-50 (1973)
(Douglas, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59
(1932) (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
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entrapment is United States v. Russell, 20 in which the Court
held that the defendant was not entrapped into manufacturing
methamphetamine when government agents supplied an essential
chemical for the making of the contraband. In the Russell major-
ity opinion, 21 the Court recognized a second line of analysis for
determining when a defendant is entrapped. The Court stated that
a fact situation could exist "in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to
obtain a conviction . *.".., Even prior to Russell, the Fifth Cir-
cuit and many federal district courts had taken a dim view of the
government's supplying contraband to defendants. In United
States v. Bueno,2 3 the Fifth Circuit held that such activity consti-
tuted entrapment as a matter of law when the defendant's testi-
mony was uncontradicted as to the fact that a government agent
supplied the contraband the defendant was later charged with sell-
ing. The need for even tighter control on the government was rec-
ognized by Justice Douglas2 as well as many other Supreme
Court Justices.25 To them, when the government supplies the nec-
20. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
21. It is interesting to note in Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), Douglas, Marshall, and
Stewart, JJ., dissented, while in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (convic-
tion sustained even though government agents supplied the contraband), Powell, J., wrote a
concurring opinion in which Blackmun, J., joined, and Brennan, J., wrote a dissenting opin-
ion in which Marshall and Stewart, JJ., joined; Stevens, J., took no part in the case.
22. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (1973). Defendant Russell admitted that the jury
could have reasonably found that he had the intent or predisposition to commit the offense.
Russell, therefore, did not rely on the Sorrells predisposition test to determine whether he
was entrapped. The defendant argued that the Court should adopt a rule holding that it is
entrapment per se when a government agent supplies a defendant with an indispensable
means to commit an offense. Citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court
stated that a due process test might be applied when police conduct reached the "outra-
geous" level. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (1973). However, the Court would not substitute
this test for the Sorrells test. Id. at 433. In any event, the Court found that the level of the
government agent's conduct was short of violating due process considerations. Id. at 432.
23. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973). See, e.g.,
United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (A government agent sup-
plied the defendant with counterfeit money and later arrested him for receiving the same.
The court held defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law.). It is interesting to note
that the Seventh Circuit followed a rationale similar to to that in Bueno in United States v.
McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 936 (1973). The Supreme
Court remanded McGrath for reconsideration after its decision in United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973). Upon remand the Seventh Circuit reversed its holding, United States
v. McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1973), raising the question whether the Bueno ration-
ale survived United States v. Russell. See also United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161
(5th Cir. 1974) (entrapment established conclusively where defendant is charged with pos-
session or sale of contraband to a government agent if the contraband was supplied to the
defendant by a government agent).
24. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 437 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
25. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
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essary ingredient for the commission of the offense, regardless of
whether the defendant could have obtained it from another source,
the government is a participant in the offense. This violates funda-
mental fairness. Douglas' rule is the outer bounds of the due pro-
cess approach; the rule in Bueno seems to apply this due process
approach but limits that approach in a way similar to the holding
of the later case of Hampton v. United States." In Hampton, the
plurality27 held that the defendant, who sold heroin to federal
agents pursuant to arrangements made by them, was not en-
trapped because he was predisposed to commit the crime. The plu-
rality held that the only remedy for predisposed defendants is in
prosecuting the police for their misconduct under provisions of
state or federal law.2 8 The concurring justices found the entrap-
ment defense to be based on due process but held that the degree
of government involvement in Hampton did not rise to the level of
a due process violation, however, they did not rule out the possibil-
ity of entrapment based on due process considerations. 9 Using
Hampton as a guide, the level of governmental involvement pre-
sent in a case must be very high indeed before a person will be
held to have been entrapped on a due process basis.
Hampton teaches that a due process "entrapment" defense
does exist; however, the Fifth Circuit has been consistently reluc-
tant to apply it 30 On the other hand, some circuit courts have
barred prosecutions based on a due process rationale because of
governmental over-involvement. 1 Even though a majority of the
in the result); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring
opinion); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
27. Rehnquist, J., wrote for the plurality and was joined by Burger, C.J., and White,
J.; Powell, J., wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Blackmun, J. To further illus-
trate how divided the decision was, it is notable that the concurring and dissenting justices
criticized the restriction of the entrapment defense. Id. at 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring);
Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These justices constituted an actual majority of the
Court.
28. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
29. "In these circumstances I am unwilling to conclude that an analysis other than
one limited to predisposition would never be appropriate under due process principles."
Hampton, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1118 (1982); United States v. Garrett, 583 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); United
States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United
States v. Evers, 552 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977).
31. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978) (a government agent sug-
gested establishment of a drug laboratory, supplied indispensable ingredient, made almost
all of supply purchases, provided technical information and site for laboratory). See Green
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (After the defendants had been paroled for
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members of the United States Supreme Court 2 and several cir-
cuit courts recognize a due process entrapment defense, the rule in
the Fifth Circuit seems to require an almost impossibly high level
of police involvement before due process will bar prosecution.3
Along with predisposition and due process, Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Sherman v. United States,3" seemed to sug-
gest a third approach, objective in nature, that questions whether
the level of police conduct "falls below standards, to which com-
mon feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power." 3 '5  Due process entrapment analysis will protect only
against outrageous conduct.3 6 Those in accord with the Frank-
furter approach37 feel that this method would make predisposition
irrelevant 38 and better protect the government's true self-interest
in preserving its purity and respectability. 9 In Sherman, the Su-
preme Court held entrapment was established when a government
agent succeeded in convincing the defendant to sell him narcotics
after persistent solicitation and appeals to sympathy in the face of
reluctance by the defendant to cooperate. The Court, in an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Warren, declared Mr. Sherman a vic-
bootlegging, a government agent solicited them to resume production of liquor. The agent
sold sugar to defendants at discount prices and offered to provide them with a still operator
as well as necessary equipment.).
32. See supra note 27.
33. -[T]he government may not instigate the criminal activity, provide the place,
equipment, supplies and know-how, and run the entire operation with only meager assis-
tance from the defendants without violating fundamental fairness." United States v. To-
bias, 662 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
34. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
35. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
36. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also Hampton
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
38. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382.
39. Justice Holmes, writing about an equally unseemly governmental practice, stated
the following:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end all available
evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the Government should not
itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained .... [Flor my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), quoted in




tim of creative law enforcement activity.4
Clearly, the law of entrapment in federal courts is a mixed
bag of various views about entrapment's foundations and the
methods of analysis that should be used to determine its applica-
tion and effects.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS OF Mississippi ENTRAPMENT LAW
The defense of entrapment is not of constitutional signifi-
cance; therefore, the federal decisions are not binding on the
states.41 However, they are often cited in the Mississippi cases on
entrapment and do seem to provide the theoretical starting points
for the court's decisions.
In Mississippi, the defense of entrapment got off to a lack-
luster start in the case of French v. State,42 where the defendant's
conviction of illegally selling liquor was affirmed. The Court held
that the sale of intoxicating liquor was a violation of the law re-
gardless of the intent of the seller. A jury instruction on entrap-
ment was held properly refused even though the defendant testi-
fied that the liquor he sold was the property of the prohibition
officer who induced him to sell it. The old rule as employed in
French did not embody a "subjective" or an "objective" approach
but an effective ban on the entrapment defense in the area of of-
fenses relating to possession and sale of contraband.
In McLemore v. State," the Court adopted a "subjective"
approach to entrapment when it stated:
The word 'entrapment,' as a defense, has come to mean the act of
inducing or leading a person to commit a crime not originally con-
templated by him, for the purpose of trapping him in its commission
and prosecuting him for the offense. However, defendant cannot rely
on the fact that an opportunity was intentionally given him to com-
mit the crime which originated in the mind of the accused. The fact
that an opportunity is furnished constitutes no defense.""
This definition of entrapment and the subjective considera-
tions of intent it embraces were reaffirmed in several Mississippi
40. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (citing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451).
41. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973); Ainsworth v. Reed, 542 F.2d
243 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); Jones v. State, 285 So. 2d 152, 159
(Miss. 1973).
42. 149 Miss. 684, 115 So. 705 (1928) (en banc).
43. 241 Miss. 664, 125 So. 2d 86 (1960).
44. Id. at 675, 125 So. 2d at 91 (citing I ANDERSON'S WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 132 (1957)).
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cases which also recognized the existence of the defense of entrap-
ment in contraband possession and sale cases.45
Jones v. State4 was the first case in Mississippi that involved
a fact situation similar to Epps. Mississippi narcotics agents were
not aware that a paid confidential informant working for them
had furnished the marijuana to Mr. Jones, from whom the agent
later purchased the same marijuana. The court held that when a
defendant asserts the affirmative defense of entrapment and goes
forward with proof tending to establish the defense, the burden of
proof shifts to the state.47 In this case, the confidential informant
did not testify, and there was no rebuttal offered by the state as to
whether the state actually supplied the marijuana." The court
held that entrapment was established as a matter of law. Justice
Sugg, writing for the court in Jones, offered this quote from Peo-
ple v. Strong: 9
While we are sympathetic to the problems of enforcement agencies
in controlling the narcotics traffic, and their use of informers to that
end, we cannot condone the action of one acting for the government
in supplying the very narcotics that gave rise to the alleged offense.
We know of no conviction for sale of narcotics that has been sus-
tained when the narcotics sold were supplied by an agent of the gov-
ernment. This is more than mere inducement.5 0
This quote, in the most recent Mississippi case addressing the
Epps-type situation, gives much insight into the theory on which
the defense of entrapment is now based in Mississippi. The lan-
guage "we cannot condone the action of one acting for the govern-
ment in supplying the very narcotics that gave rise to the alleged
offense," suggests an "objective" approach that focuses on the
level of activity of the law enforcement officials and their agents.
When the quantum of governmental involvement reaches a certain
level, such as the level reached when the government agents actu-
45. Alston v. State, 258 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1972); Reeves v. State, 244 So. 2d 5
(Miss. 1971); Laughter v. State, 235 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1970); Hogan v. State, 233 So. 2d
786 (Miss. 1970).
46. 285 So. 2d 152 (Miss. 1973).
47. Id. at 159 (citing Alston v. State, 258 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1972)).
48. Id. at 154, 159.
49. 21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961), cited with approval in Jones v. State, 285
So. 2d 152, 159 (Miss. 1973).
50. Strong, 21 111. 2d at 325, 172 N.E.2d at 768. See also People v. Carmichael, 80
Ill. App. 2d 293, 225 N.E.2d 458 (1967) (A police informer supplied the defendant with
narcotics which subsequently were sold to government agents. No rebuttal by the state was
offered. The court held the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law.).
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ally supply the defendant with marijuana, then the criminal intent
is that of the state. 51 No mention of a violation of the defendant's
due process rights was made. This reluctance of the Mississippi
Supreme Court to condone such a level of governmental activity is
a derivative of feelings expressed in the United States Supreme
Court by Justice Frankfurter when he said, "The courts refuse to
convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his
guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Govern-
ment . . cannot be countenanced. "52 Justice Frankfurter's views
were also shared by many of his colleagues on the Court.
53
In Sylar v. State,54 one narcotics agent, a "friend" of the de-
fendant, induced him, after several unsuccessful attempts, to carry
a package of marijuana to a second narcotics agent, and sell it to
him. The first narcotics agent did not testify. The one who con-
summated the purchase did give testimony relevant to predisposi-
tion. 5 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and discharged the defendant, calling the whole transaction
a play, a charade, and a fiction.5" The Mississippi Supreme Court
dealt with the holding in Hampton,57 and the due process ap-
proach, by distinguishing Hampton from Sylar. This distinction
centered on the fact that Hampton originally proposed the idea to
commit the offense, thereby being predisposed; the government
merely gave him the opportunity to carry out his wish. The court
held that in this instance Sylar "did no more than yield to the
importunities of one state agent to deliver marijuana supplied by
the State to another state agent.
' 58
Entrapment per se is a term used to describe situations like
those in Jones and Epps where the level of state involvement is
too high as a matter of law to let a conviction stand. This most
51. Jones, 285 So. 2d at 159.
52. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53. See supra notes 11 and 39 and accompanying text.
54. 340 So. 2d 10 (Miss. 1976).
55. Id. at II. The agent testified about a conversation at the time of the sale during
which he tried to get Sylar to take less money for the marijuana due to its low quality.
Sylar refused to recede from the $120 he was instructed to collect and stated the quality
would be better next time. Id.
56. Id.
57. A predisposed defendant cannot validly assert entrapment contending that the
governmental conduct was so outrageous as to violate due process. Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). The Court recognized the passage in Russell, 411 U.S. at
431-32, but did not adopt a due process test for determining the level of government mis-
conduct. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Sylar, 340 So. 2d at 11.
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often comes up when government agents sell illegal drugs to citi-
zens. The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted the holding in a
New Jersey case as its rule on entrapment per se in those cases
where the government supplies the defendant with the contraband
which is the subject of a later prosecution: 59
We hold that where an informer or other agent generally acting in
concert with law enforcement authorities, furnishes a defendant with
heroin for the purpose of then arranging a sale of the heroin by the
defendant to an undercover officer, which sale is then consummated,
defendant has been entrapped as a matter of law even though pre-
disposition to commit the crime may appear .... so
This is a purely "objective" approach to determine when a defen-
dant is entrapped per se in a contraband sale case. Presumably,
the same rule would apply if the prosecution were for contraband
possession when a government agent supplied the contraband.
This rule has been followed in all subsequent Mississippi cases
dealing with fact patterns where the state has supplied the defen-
dant with the contraband he is accused of selling.61
ANALYSIS OF Epps v. State
The holding in Epps 2 was directly controlled by the holdings
in Jones, Sylar, and Torrence v. State.6" The Mississippi rule of
entrapment per se established in those cases holds that when state
agents supply the defendant with the contraband which provides
the basis of the charges against him, entrapment as a matter of
law is established.
Johnny Epps testified that Alex Butler, a confidential in-
former, gave him the cocaine; this made out a prima facie case of
entrapment. When the state failed to offer rebuttal evidence to the
contention that it had supplied Epps with the cocaine through its
agent, Alex Butler, the court was bound to follow the rule that
59. Id. at 12 (quoting from State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976)).
60. Talbot, 71 N.J. at 168, 364 A.2d at 12.
61. See Torrence v. State, 380 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1980). Contra, Id. at 250 n.1,
which states: "There may well be circumstances where the authorities, in order to flush out
criminal activity, may furnish a suspect with contraband and subsequently purchase that
contraband from him. Compare United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36
L.Ed. 2d 366 (1973). But this is not the case."
62. 417 So. 2d 543 (Miss. 1982).
63. Torrence, 380 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1980), wherein a state agent provided the drugs
which were the basis of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. The Mississippi
Supreme Court discharged the defendant, holding he was entrapped as a matter of law.
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this sort of state misconduct toward the defendant constituted en-
trapment as a matter of law.
The importance of Epps v. State lies in what the court did
not do rather than in what it did. Even in these times of increas-
ing emphasis on fighting drug-related crime, coupled with the gen-
eral conservative tide in the nation, the Mississippi Supreme
Court did not follow the United States Supreme Court's more
conservative rule of entrapment propounded in Hampton v. United
States (i.e., that predisposed defendants can still be convicted,
even though the government supplied the contraband). The rule
derived from Epps makes predisposition irrelevant. Simply put,
when the state, through one of its agents, supplies the contraband
that is the subject of later charges, entrapment is established as a
matter of law. This rule, which has its genesis in Jones v. State,65
holds that when the government supplies the contraband to the
defendant, the criminal intent is that of the supplier and not the
defendant. 6 Therefore, in cases with fact patterns similar to
Epps, the court has predetermined that the intent for criminal ac-
tion is not in the defendant but with the state. This method of
analysis automatically makes predisposition or intent on the part
of the defendant irrelevant. Possibly there are ways the state can
supply the contraband to the defendant and later charge him with
its possession or sale. For example, suppose the defendant himself
first proposes the commission of a crime to a government agent
and the two cooperate. If as a part of this cooperative enterprise
the agent supplies the defendant with the contraband, it could be
held that the agent was merely furnishing the defendant with an
opportunity to commit the offense and not supplying the criminal
intent.67 However, the chance that this method would be upheld
seems legally doubtful in light of the fact that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court has so strongly embraced the New Jersey case of
State v. Talbot," which held, after a review of the Hampton deci-
sion, that predisposition does not bar the valid assertion of the
entrapment defense where the government supplies the defendant
64. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (It must be remembered this "rule" was only a plurality
decision.).
65. 285 So. 2d 152 (Miss. 1973).
66. Id. at 159.
67. Cf. Sylar, 340 So. 2d 10 (The court distinguished Sylar from Hampton on the
basis that in Hampton the defendant initially proposed the crime.).
68. 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976). The Mississippi Supreme Court has cited this
case and quoted from it at length in Sylar, 340 So. 2d at 11; Torrence, 380 So. 2d at 250;
Epps, 417 So. 2d at 545.
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with the contraband. In this situation, entrapment is established
as a matter of law. 9
The possibility of the state's properly furnishing contraband
to a defendant and later successfully prosecuting him for its pos-
session or sale is somewhat enhanced by Justice Walker's first
footnote in Torrence v. State.70 There he suggested that, in certain
circumstances, the government may supply a suspect with contra-
band and later purchase it from him in order to discover criminal
activity. Whether this purchase of contraband supplied to the sus-
pect by government agents is to constitute the basis of the charges
to be brought against the suspect or just to be used as a decoy or
detection device is not entirely clear.
The Mississippi rule that entrapment is established per se
when the state supplies to the defendant the contraband which is
later the subject of the charges against him is to be preferred from
a public policy standpoint to the predisposition centered rule in
Hampton. It is not the place of the government or its officials, who
should be setting the example for the rest of society to follow, to
be engaged in creating crimes. 71 Objective and specific rules as to
what constitutes entrapment per se, are to be preferred to a due
process based approach. There is a great chance that barring pros-
ecution because the level of governmental misconduct involved in
a case violates the defendant's due process rights might produce
irreconcilable variations in holdings as to exactly the level of state
misconduct that will bar prosecution in various fact situations.
Contraband cases, where entrapment is a viable defense, can
be generally categorized into two basic classifications. First is the
situation where government agents ask the defendant to obtain
contraband and sell it to them. In this type of case, entrapment is
almost always determined on the basis of whether the defendant
was predisposed to sell the agent the contraband or whether the
agent, through his persistence, implanted the criminal design in
the mind of the defendant. If the agent is found to have implanted
the criminal design in the defendant's mind, entrapment will be a
valid defense. In this type of case, the predisposition or intent of
the defendant is relevant and should be considered. However, in
the second class of cases, where the government supplies the con-
traband to the defendant and then purchases it from him, predis-
69. Sylar, 340 So. 2d at 11-12.
70. 380 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1980); see supra note 61.
71. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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position should be irrelevant, 2 either because the criminal intent
can be viewed to be that of the government agent73 or because the
level of governmental misconduct in the case cannot be condoned
by the court.
74
The value of the Epps decision lies in its unqualified reaffirm-
ance of the concept of fair play on the part of the government,
which is necessary to foster respect for the courts and law enforce-
ment in general. The rule of entrapment per se, upheld in Epps,
serves the needed purpose of taking a complicated and theoretical
area of the law and providing substantive and consistent guide-
lines for its application.
John S. Knowles, III
72. Epps, 417 So. 2d at 545, citing State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 168, 365 A.2d 9, 13
(1976).
73. Jones, 285 So. 2d at 159.
74. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-80 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring in the result).
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